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NASA STI Program . . . in Profile 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA scientific and technical information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 
It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 
program provides access to the NTRS Registered 
and its public interface, the NASA Technical 
Reports Server, thus providing one of the largest 
collections of aeronautical and space science STI in 
the world. Results are published in both non-NASA 
channels and by NASA in the NASA STI Report 
Series, which includes the following report types: 
 
 
x TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
Programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
information deemed to be of continuing 
reference value. NASA counter-part of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers but has 
less stringent limitations on manuscript length 
and extent of graphic presentations. 
 
x TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
x CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
 
 
 
 
x CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. 
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 
or other meetings sponsored or  
co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
x SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
x TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.  
English-language translations of foreign 
scientific and technical material pertinent to  
NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services also include organizing 
and publishing research results, distributing 
specialized research announcements and feeds, 
providing information desk and personal search 
support, and enabling data exchange services. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
x Access the NASA STI program home page 
at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
x E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
x Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at  
757-864-9658 
 
x Write to: 
           NASA STI Information Desk 
           Mail Stop 148 
           NASA Langley Research Center 
           Hampton, VA 23681-2199
 National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration 
 
Langley Research Center   
Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199  
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Appendix A.  Interviews Conducted and Documents Reviewed 
Interviews conducted by the assessment team included: 
• Exploration Systems Development (ESD) personnel:  
– Integrated Hazard Analysis Working Group (IHAWG) Chairman 
– System Safety Functional Area Lead 
– Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer (CSO) 
– Crew Survivability Integrated Task Team (ITT) Lead 
– Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)/Space Launch System (SLS) Abort Integration 
Team (MSAIT) ITT Lead 
• Stakeholders: 
– ESD Chief Engineer – Paul McConnaughey 
– NASA Chief Engineer – Ralph Roe 
– Chief, S&MA – Terry Wilcutt 
– Director, NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) – Tim Wilson 
– ESD Deputy Associate Administrator – Dan Dumbacher 
– ESD Assistant Deputy Associate Administrator – Bill Hill 
– Former Chief, S&MA, Current Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Member –  
Bryan O’Connor 
ESD and Program documentation reviewed by the assessment team included: 
• “Integrated Hazard Analysis Deep Dive” presentation 
• Program documentation 
– Cross-Program S&MA Plan  (ESD 10010) 
– ESD Systems Safety Analysis Report (10015) 
– IHAWG Task Agreement 
– IHAWG Guidance for Analysis Causes  
– Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) S&MA Plan  
(GSDO-LN-1036) 
– Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) S&MA Plan (MPCV 70294) 
– SLS S&MA Plan (SLS-PLAN-013) 
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– SLS Abort Triggers Definition Document (SLS-SPEC-197) 
– GSDO Top Level Operational Hazard Analysis Fault Tree  
– MPCV Master Hazards List 
– SLS Master Hazards List (SLS-RPT-076) 
– ESD Risk Management Plan (ESD 10003) 
– ESD Implementation Plan (ESD 10001) 
– Charter for the ESD Control Board (ESD-MD-12002) 
– Joint Program Control Board Charter (JPCB 0001) 
– Cross-program Ascent Aborts Analysis Methodology (MPCV 72519) 
– Orion MPCV Crew Survival Analysis Exploration Mission 2 Reference Missions  
(MPCV 72532) 
– Orion MPCV Vehicle Integration Control Board/Joint Integration Control Board 
Charter (MPCV 0074) 
– SLS Chief Engineer Control Board/Joint Integration Control Board Charter  
– Selected Cause Records and Cause Trees 
Other documentation reviewed by the assessment team included: 
• Prior human spaceflight (HSF) program related documentation 
– Apollo Safety Program Plan  
– KSC Apollo Safety Systems Program Plan 
– Apollo Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis procedure 
– Shuttle Integrated Hazard Report IPYR-01, Pyrotechnic System Malfunction 
• Tim Wilson’s integration white paper “Improving Exploration Systems Integration,  
29 January 2014” 
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Appendix B. “Integrated Hazard Analysis Deep Dive” 
Presentation to ESD Management 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Integrated Hazard Analysis Deep Dive
January 2014
IHAWG/Jeff Williams
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Purpose
• Provide overview of ESI Integrated Hazard Analysis approach, 
structure, and content.
• Discuss selected details of IHA.
• Discuss forward work.
2
 
Agenda
• Approach to ESI IHA:
• Benefits and limitations of hazard analysis
• IHAWG Org
• Scope – What’s in and what’s out
• Methodology – Non-traditional approach: advantages, disadvantages, and lessons learned
• Development and review for PDR
• Deliveries for major program & integrated milestones
• Top-level view of the IHA:
• Major hazardous conditions (by area).
• Major causes for hazardous conditions
• Slices of the IHA:
• High risk hazard cause summary
• Elevated Watch Items
• Deep dive into areas of interest
• Success stories:
• Known areas where IHA impacted design
• Final IHA status for GSDO PDR
• Forward Work for IHAWG:
• Model restructuring
• Getting to Orion delta-PDR and ESI Design-to Sync
3
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Approach to IHA
4
 
BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF HAZARD 
ANALYSIS
Approach to ESI IHA
5
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Approach to ESI IHA:  Benefits & Limitations of HA
• Why we do Hazard Analysis:
• Influence Design and Operations
• Identify, Communicate, Mitigate, and Accept Risk
• Identify Hazard Controls for “Posterity” – Relate selected design and operational 
parameters to hazard controls to assure retention.
• Limitations of HA:
• Primarily Qualitative – no cumulative assessment of risk
• Can’t capture all the unknowns
6
 
ESI IHA ORGANIZATION
Approach to ESI IHA
7
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Approach to ESI IHA:  ESI IHA Organization
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHAWG Organization (Membership)
• Per IHAWG Task Agreement, IHAWG membership includes:
• Core members:
• CSI - IHAWG Lead
• GSDO, Orion & SLS SMA 
• GSDO, Orion & SLS Engineering 
• Ad hoc members:
• Health and Medical TA
• Crew Office
• Mission Operations
• HQ Office of S&MA
• ESD Chief Engineer
9
Reps are from center line orgs
• Reps from other System Safety Functional Area ITTs
• Discipline experts
• Safety Panel Chairs
• Center S&MA Reps and Safety Engineers
• Contractor Reps
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Approach to ESI IHA:  ESI IHA Organization
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IHAWG
IHA Architecture Team IHA Cause Teams
Program Engineering & S&MA
IHAWG Lead
Program Engineering
Program S&MA
Others as required
IHAWG Structure
IHAAT coordinates development of Cause Trees.
Recommends program assignments for tree and 
cause development.
Cause Teams develop causes.
IHAWG provides overall leadership.  
Program reps assign resources to Cause and 
Cause Tree development.  
IHAWG reviews products prior to release.
 
ESI IHA SCOPE
Approach to ESI IHA
11
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Approach to ESI IHA:  ESI IHA Scope
• ESI IHA scope is established by ESD 10010, ESD S&MA Plan (section 4.1.2):
• What makes an integrated hazard or hazard cause:
• More than one program contributes to a cause, control, or verification.
• Example:  During cryo loading, GSDO controls SLS tank pressure and SLS has 
independent pressure relief 
• More than one program contributes to the analysis of the system effect, the 
interactions/interfaces, and interdependencies of the hazard.
• Example:  All 3 Programs contribute to integrated loads analyses  
• IHA  timeframe:  Pre-launch cryo loading start to post-flight crew egress.
• EM-1 & EM-2
12
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  ESI IHA Scope
• What is IHA:
• Any failures during otherwise nominal operations that result in loss of or injury to crew or loss of 
mission.  
• Post T-0, crew injuries are either catastrophic (result in permanent disability) or critical (loss 
of mission if injury requires more than first aid).
• Error in analysis, design, or operation that may cause hazard within IHA timeframe.
• Hazards imposed by nominal system behavior during integrated operations (e.g., build-up of 
hazardous gases due to allowable leakage from more than one program).
• Hazards associated with on-pad engine shut-down.
• Hazards imposed by the presence of emergency systems (e.g., abort systems).
• What is not IHA:
• Loss of crew/vehicle during use of emergency system or operation.  Æ Failure to abort or 
perform emergency egress when needed or failure to survive abort/emergency egress are 
exempted from HA by the ESD S&MA Plan.
• IHA Causes do capture potential crew survival methods in the Crew Survival Notes field.
• Interfaces between an individual Program and external entity such as those between SLS and 
Range Safety.
• Interfaces between Program elements that do not impact other Programs.
13
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Approach to ESI IHA:  ESI IHA Scope
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NOTIONAL
Integrated HAs vs. Program HAs – Examples 
• IHA:  Under-/Over-fill of prop leading 
to off-nominal engine performance
• Not IHA:  RS-25 failure due to engine 
component  failure 
• IHA:  Inadvertent abort due improper 
notification.
• Not IHA:  Inadvertent abort d/t 
premature LAS firing.
• IHA:  Loss of comm due to system 
characteristics
• Not IHA:  Loss of comm d/t 
hardware failure.
• IHA:  Collision with tower d/t 
improper vehicle OML
• Not IHA:  Collision w/ tower d/t 
GN&C failure
• IHA:  Hazardous environment d/t 
combined sources of H2.
• Not IHA:  Hazardous environment 
d/t H2 leak.
• IHA:  Geysering in LOx line due to 
contamination.
• Not IHA:  Geysering in LOx line d/t 
Ghe supply system failure.
 
ESI IHA METHODOLOGY
Approach to ESI IHA
15
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Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
• In order to provide a product within required timeframe and to provide more 
opportunity to influence design, the IHAWG adopted a streamlined approach.  This 
approach focused on the following major aspects:
• Interfaces (Program-to-Program IRDs/ICDs):
• “Middle out” assessment based on the functions of the interface such as:
• Structural
• Electrical, data, or fluid pass-through
• Operations (specifically, the ESD Con Ops):
• Hazards imposed by planned ops.
• Environments (Thermal, winds, plume, etc.)
• Experience of Past Programs (SSP, CxP)
16
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
• Methodology adopted was “non-traditional” when compared to approaches used in 
past HSF programs.
• ESI IHA Cause Trees are not part of a single, comprehensive hazard model such as:
• Top-down fault tree
• Functional hazard analysis
• Hazard checklist
• With this methodology, classic hazard reports (a high-level hazard broken into causes) 
are not produced.  
• Cause trees are needed to relate individual causes to each other and to higher 
level Hazardous Conditions.
17
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Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
18
Cross Program architecture was assessed to identify hardware interfaces (i.e., mechanical, electrical, fluid, etc.), 
system interactions, and interdependencies to define a comprehensive list of
hazardous conditions/hazard topic areas.  Approximately 270 hazardous conditions were identified.
Preliminary
Architecture 
Assessment
Closely coupled Engineering  and S&MA teams identified ~270 hazardous conditions.
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
19
Hazardous 
Condition 
Development
Cross Program architecture was assessed to identify hardware interfaces (i.e., mechanical, electrical, fluid, etc.), 
system interactions, and interdependencies to define a comprehensive list of
hazardous conditions/hazard topic areas.  Approximately 270 hazardous conditions were identified.
Hazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XX
Preliminary
Architecture 
Assessment
The hazardous conditions identified in the preliminary 
assessment were reviewed to eliminate duplication, 
identify Program-only content, identify single event 
causes and organized into natural groupings for cause 
tree development.  Final review resulted in 70+ 
hazardous conditions.
270 conditions assessed by CSI, Program S&MA, and Program Engineering and placed 
into logical groupings.
Groupings would become the starting point for next step – Cause Tree development.
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Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
20
Hazardous 
Condition 
Development
Cross Program architecture was assessed to identify hardware interfaces (i.e., mechanical, electrical, fluid, etc.), 
system interactions, and interdependencies to define a comprehensive list of
hazardous conditions/hazard topic areas.  Approximately 270 hazardous conditions were identified.
Step 1:
First/Preliminary Draft
Developed
Step 2:
Final Draft Reviewed
By Technical Community
For Development of 
Final Product
ESI MPCV GSDO SLS
Hazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XX
ESI ESI
Cause Tree
Development
Preliminary
Architecture 
Assessment
The hazardous conditions identified in the preliminary 
assessment were reviewed to eliminate duplication, 
identify Program-only content, identify single event 
causes and organized into natural groupings for cause 
tree development.  Final review resulted in 70+ 
hazardous conditions.
Each Top-Level Hazardous Condition was assigned to a Program to lead the 
development of Cause Trees.
ESI-owned Causes were “harvested” from Trees and assigned to Program Cause Teams 
for development.
Program-only causes were identified and provided to appropriate programs for 
consideration in their HA efforts.
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
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Hazardous 
Condition 
Development
Cross Program architecture was assessed to identify hardware interfaces (i.e., mechanical, electrical, fluid, etc.), 
system interactions, and interdependencies to define a comprehensive list of
hazardous conditions/hazard topic areas.  Approximately 270 hazardous conditions were identified.
Step 1:
First/Preliminary Draft
Developed
Step 2:
Final Draft Reviewed
By Technical Community
For Development of 
Final Product
ESI MPCV* GSDO* SLS*
Hazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XXHazardous 
Condition #XX
ESI ESI
Cause Tree
Development
Preliminary
Architecture 
Assessment
ESI Cause
Development
The hazardous conditions identified in the preliminary 
assessment were reviewed to eliminate duplication, 
identify Program-only content, identify single event 
causes and organized into natural groupings for cause 
tree development.  Final review resulted in 70+ 
hazardous conditions.
Cause Accountability Leads# Title
Master Cause List
ESI Cause XXX
ESI Cause XXX
ESI Cause XXX
ESI Cause Development
*Accountability Matrix (Transfers Program Only 
Causes to Programs for Assessment)
ESI Watch List
Program CEs  accept 
ownership & CPIT  tracks 
closure
CPIT 
Presented to:
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Approach to ESI IHA:  Methodology
• Advantages of chosen approach:
• Allowed for a product with opportunity to influence design.
• Used available cross-program products in absence of more detailed design definition.
• Implementable with limited resources, the vast majority of which are provided by ESD 
Programs.
• Easily adaptable.  Can add Cause Trees and Causes as design changes. (Example:  Vehicle 
Stabilization System)
• Disadvantages:
• Potential to miss something due to lack of more structured model.
• Concerns and Lessons Learned:
• Common understanding of approach by all those involved in IHA development and review 
(including stakeholders).
• Difficult to see the “big picture” for causes and relationships between causes. Often results in 
scoping issues for these causes. 
• Example:  Fire/Explosion causes are spread among multiple trees. 
• Sustainability and maintainability of the model structure over the long term.
22
 
ESI IHA DEVELOPMENT & REVIEW
Approach to ESI IHA
23
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Product Development & Review
IHA Maturity for PDR
• These criteria for IHA content were approved by ESMAP and will be included 
in next rev of ESD S&MA Plan.
• IHA content consistent with level of PDR design definition.
• Hazard topics showing relationship between hazard topic and causes 
• Description and effect(s) for each hazardous topic
• Hazard causes identified
• Elimination/Mitigation strategies or preliminary controls for the hazard 
causes 
• Failure Tolerance/exception approach for applicable hazard causes
• Preliminary verification methods for each hazard control 
• Potential Crew Survival Methods (CSM) for catastrophic hazards and 
descriptions of their role in ensuring crew survival 
• All action items/RIDs required to be closed for phase I/PDR have been 
dispositioned
24
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Product Development & Review
Products from ESI IHA  
• The ESI System Safety Analysis Report (ESI 10015) is the primary IHA product for 
any given milestone:
• Methodology Summary
• Cause Trees
• ESI Cause Sheets (aka Cause Records)
• Cause Title
• Description & Effects
• Mitigation Strategy and Acceptance Rationale
• Controls & Verifications
• Likelihood and Severity (LxS)
• …
• Program-only causes
• ESI Watch Items 
• High Risk Causes
• The ESI SSAR is delivered as a draft for each Program’s major milestone.
• The SSAR will be baselined before or around the ESD Design-To Sync and formally 
revised for subsequent ESD milestones.
25
~95% of the SSAR content
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Product Development & Review
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TYPICAL CAUSE TREE
TYPICAL CAUSE RECORD
(partial)
ESI-owned Causes 
are “harvested” 
from Cause Trees
• 75 Cause Trees total.
• 70 Trees delivered with SSAR 
for GSDO PDR
• 190 Total Causes
• 149 with GSDO content 
(including 10 forward work 
Causes)
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review for PDR
• Cause Tree Development & Review:
• All Cause Trees are assigned to a program S&MA engineer who facilitates the development of 
the Tree in collaboration with Engineering and S&MA from impacted or contributing programs.
• After initial drafting, a review is held with all appropriate stakeholders (including IHAWG 
members).  Successful completion of that review results in a Cause Tree that is “Phase B 
complete”.
• Cause Development:
• ESI-owned Causes are harvested from Phase B Cause Trees and assigned to a Program for 
development.
• After basic Cause info is drafted (description, effects, mitigation strategy), IHAWG Lead and 
others meet with Cause Team to review and adjust the “scope” of the cause.
• IHAWG provided guidance on minimum content for PDR-mature causes.  Also provided 
guidance on certain IHA cause categories to promote maturity and commonality.
• IHAWG Program Engineering and S&MA reps assign personnel to work together on Cause.
• Cause Review:
• Multiple reviews of IHA Causes to date:
• IHAWG/Grey-Beard Review of Causes and Trees prior to SLS PDR 
• ESD Change Request prior to SLS PDR
• Internal “Recovery” review by IHAWG post-SLS PDR
• IHAWG Table-Top Review prior to GSDO PDR (continued on next chart)
27
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review for PDR
• Cause Review (continued):
• For GSDO PDR, the following review approach was employed:
• IHAWG table-top reviews were convened for the purpose of reviewing each cause needed 
for GSDO PDR (i.e., with GSDO content) prior to delivery to the milestone review.
• Chief Engineers and CSOs from ESI and each Program were invited to “augment” their 
participation in these reviews as desired.
• Cause Teams incorporate IHAWG agreed-to comments into causes.
• IHAWG Lead approves Cause for release to milestone review once comments (including 
comments from previous reviews) are verified as appropriately incorporated.
• Typical attendance for a Table-Top Review included:
28
• Mission Ops Rep
• Orion CE Rep
• GSDO CE Rep
• SLS CE Rep
• SLS CSO Rep
• IHAWG Admin
• Program Engineering
• Program S&MA
• Discipline ExpertsReviewers
Presenters
* Program Engineering/SMA & IHAWG Lead
• Core IHAWG Members*
• CSI CSO Rep
• CSI CE Rep
• Crew Rep
• HMTA Rep
• IHAAT Members
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review for PDR
• IHAWG Watch Items:
• Watch Items are opened as needed by any IHA team member to track any number 
of things, from issues to open work to process improvements.
• IHAWG periodically reviews Watch Items for status.  IHAWG may elevate 
individual Watch Items to CPIT as needed to get help in resolving the WI.  (IHAWG 
may also elevate certain WI’s for visibility.)
• While IHAWG tracks multiple WI’s, only those that have been elevated to CPIT and 
communicated to Program stakeholders are included in the ESI SSAR.
29
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review 
Cross Program Hazard Analysis Database
• IHAWG makes extensive use of Ames-developed CP Hazard Database:
• Cause records
• Cause Tree metadata
• Watch Items
• Review and approval for release
• Reporting, including the bulk of the SSAR
• Database and developers are extremely flexible and responsive to changes 
needed by IHA Team.
30
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review for PDR
SSAR Delivery for Program PDRs and ESD Sync
31
SLS PDR GSDO PDR Orion Δ-PDR ESD DT Sync
SSAR Draft 1 SSAR Draft 2 SSAR Draft 3 SSAR Draft 4
RIDs/Comments RIDs/Comments RIDs/Comments
• 48 Cause Trees 
• 153 Causes with SLS 
Content
• 70 Cause Trees (info only)
• ~149 Causes with GSDO Content 
(reviewable) *
• 33 Causes from Updated SLS PDR w/o 
GSDO content   (info only) *
• ~75 (TBR) Cause Trees (info only)
• ~50 (TBR) Causes with Orion Content 
(reviewable) *
• ~140 (TBR) Updated Causes from previous 
PDRs w/o Orion content (Info only) *
• All Cause Trees & Causes (reviewable) *
* Minus any causes that are known forward work
SSAR B/LCR
ES
D 
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m
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ha
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e 
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Top-Level View of the IHA
32
 
CAUSE TREES
Top-Level View of IHA
33
(ESI-018) Improper 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Separation
ESI-018
Premature Separation 
of the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G001
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
S tructural Failure
G004
Excessive Loading
G012
Improper Fluid 
Characteristics
G016
ESI 4985
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G018
ESI 095
GSDO  Design   
A ll owable  Loads 
Exceeded
G019
GSDO
SLS Design 
  A ll owable Loads 
Exceeded
G020
SLS
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G021
GSDO 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G022
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G014
GSDO 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G015
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P remature Release
G006
Premature release 
signal sent to LRS
G007
ESI 5000
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G061
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G062
SLS
Failure to P roperly 
Separate the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G002
Late, Incorrect or No 
  ICP S  Fwd Um bi lical 
Release
G025
Late, Incorrect or No 
 Primary Release 
Mechanism
G029
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G033
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G064
GSDO
Primary mechanism is 
release cmd sent to 
LRS for Umbilical 
P late P in Retract
G067
ESI 5000
Late, Incorrect or No 
Secondary Release 
Mechanism
G063
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G065
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G066
GSDO
Secondary mechanism 
is  activation of 
GSDO winch/wire rope
G068
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P late Hangup/ 
Mechanical Binding
G045
SLS
CSITU Fails Due to 
Inadequate Design 
Analysis, Reqts 
defintion, Ops 
P rocedures
G013
ESI 4959
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Re-Contact with the 
Vehicle
G003
ESI 5008
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Major Hazardous Conditions 
• The IHAWG currently tracks 75 top-level Hazardous Conditions as Cause Trees.
• The following table shows the major categories in which these trees fall:
34
Cause Tree Area
Number 
of Trees
Improper Cryo Load (LH2 and LOx – Core Stage and ICPS) 4
Improper Helium Load (Core Stage & ICPS) 2
LOx Geysering 1
Crew Access Arm Extendable Platform Impacts/Collides With 
Vehicle
1
Fire/Explosion In SLS/Orion Shared Compartment 1
Hazardous Environment External to Vehicle 2
Improper Crew Compartment Atmosphere During Launch 
Operations
1
Improper Operation Of FTS Leads To A Catastrophic Event 1
Improper Power Between GSDO and Flight Element 2
Structural Failure Of The MSA 1
Structural Failure Of The Vehicle Support Posts (VSPs) 1
Violation Of Thermal Environment Limits In The ISPE-SM 
Compartment
1
Excessive Vehicle/Tower Excursions 1
Improper Umbilical or T-0 Interface Operation Up to T-0 (1 
Tree per interface)
13
Improper Umbilical or T-0 Separation (1 Tree per interface) 13
Improper Ignition Overpressure Or Acoustics During Liftoff 1
Cause Tree Area
Number 
of Trees
Recontact During Lift-Off or Staging 4
Improper start or shut-down of liquid engine or off-nominal 
performance
6
Plume Impingement & Interaction 1
Premature MPCV Separation 1
Debris Impact Results In Catastrophic Failure 1
Inadvertent Abort 1
Jettisoned Hardware Impact/Recontact With The Integrated 
Vehicle
1
Jettisoned Hardware/Debris Falls Outside Expected Footprint 1
Inability to Control Vehicle Trajectory (by Mission Phase) 5
Excessive Aero-Thermal Heating To The External Surface Of 
The Vehicle
1
Loss Of Communications During Operations 1
Adverse Radiation Effect 1
Inability To Open The LAS/CM Hatches When Required 1
Unable To Safely Recover The CM/Crew During Post Landing 
Operations
1
Natural Environments Mapping Tree 1
Improper Orion/SLS Umbilical Operation or Separation 2
 
35
Cryo Loading
• Improper Cryo/He Load
• Geysering
Hazardous Environments
• O2/H2 External to Vehicle
• SLS/MPCV Shared Compartment
• Crewed Compartment
Pre-Launch T-0 – Twr Clear Ascent
IOP & Acoustics
Improper Power b/n 
GSDO & Flight Veh
T-0 Interface Mal
T-0 Improper Sep
CAA/Vehicle Impact
Orbit & TLI
Inability to Control Vehicle Trajectory
Recontact (w/ tower, during seps, w/ jettisoned H/W)
Jettisoned H/W Debris Footprint
Loss of Comm
Adverse Radiation Effect (EMI, Conducted Emissions, RF, Laser, etc.)
Debris Impact
Fail to Start or S/D Liquid Engines
Abnormal Engine Thrust
Premature Engine Shutdown
Recovery
Failure to 
Recover Crew
Plume Impingement & Interactions
Premature MPCV Separation, Inadvertent Abort
Structural Failure of Program Interface (VSPs, MSA)
Violation of Thermal Limits (Shared Compartment, Aero-thermal)
Inability to Open 
Hatches
Inability to Open 
Hatches
In-Space Ops
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Major Hazardous Conditions
Improper FTS Activation
Improper SLS/Orion Umbilical Operation or Separation
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(ESI-021) 
Malfunction of the ICPS AFT 
(JU1/JU2) Pull off Connectors 
up to Separation 
ESI-021
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G023
ESI
Improper power 
characteristics
G004
ESI-035
Signal Path Failure
G028
ESI 5048
Improper signal 
characteristics 
G030
ESI 4994
System/Component 
Failure
G009
GSDO
System/Component 
Failure
G024
SLS
Arcing and/or Ignition 
Sources
G029
ESI 5078
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/buildup)
G008
ESI 5036
Improper design analysis ,
requirements definition and 
operational procedures
G011
ESI 4961
Improper or Incorrect 
Modeling and/or 
Simulation analysis
G012
ESI
Improper, Incorrect 
or undocumented 
requirements (ICD, 
IRD, etc.)
G013
ESI
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Tree Example #1
36
Arcing/Ignition:
Excessive voltage, intermittent 
connections, voltage during sep.
Malfunction of the ICPS Aft Pull-off Connectors up to Sep
Improper Signal Characteristics:  
Degradation or corruption of 
signal across interface
Signal Path Failure:  Loss of or 
misdirected signal across 
interface.
Inadequate Analysis, Definition, & Ops:
To be discussed as special topic.
Improper Umbilical Config:  
Improper build-up or installation 
of interface hardware.
6 ESI causes noted on tree (tan-
shaded events).  
Transfer to 
other cause tree
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Tree Example #2
37
(ESI-017) Malfunct ion 
of the ICPS Forward 
Umbilical up to 
separat ion
ESI -017
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G023
ESI  095
Improper Fluid 
Characterist ics
G005
ESI  4985
System/Component 
Failure
G009
GSDO
System/Component 
Failure
G024
SLS
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/buildup)
G008
ESI  5032
Improper design 
analysis requirements 
definition and 
operat ional 
procedures
G011
ESI  4959
Improper or Incorrect  
Modeling and/or 
Simulat ion analysis
G012
ESI
Improper,  Incorrect 
or undocumented 
requirements (ICD,  
IRD, etc.)
G013
ESI
ESI-017 - Malfunction of the ICPS Fwd Umbilical up to Sep
Improper Fluid Characteristics:  Improper 
fluid pressure/temp/flow/purity; ice 
build-up; contamination
Excessive Vehicle Excursion:  
Relative movement between 
flight vehicle and tower in excess 
of design limits.
Program-only causes: captured in 
Program accountability matrix 
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Tree Example #3
38
(ESI-018) Improper 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Separation
ESI-018
Premature Separation 
of the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G001
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
S tructural Failure
G004
Excessive Loading
G012
Improper Fluid 
Characteristics
G016
ESI 4985
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G018
ESI 095
GSDO  Design   
A ll owable  Loads 
Exceeded
G019
GSDO
SLS Design 
  A ll owable Loads 
Exceeded
G020
SLS
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G021
GSDO 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G022
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G014
GSDO 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G015
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P remature Release
G006
Premature release 
signal sent to LRS
G007
ESI 5000
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G061
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G062
SLS
Failure to P roperly 
Separate the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G002
Late, Incorrect or No 
  ICP S  Fwd Um bi lical 
Release
G025
Late, Incorrect or No 
 Primary Release 
Mechanism
G029
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G033
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G064
GSDO
Primary mechanism is 
release cmd sent to 
LRS for Umbilical 
P late P in Retract
G067
ESI 5000
Late, Incorrect or No 
Secondary Release 
Mechanism
G063
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G065
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G066
GSDO
Secondary mechanism 
is  activation of 
GSDO winch/wire rope
G068
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P late Hangup/ 
Mechanical Binding
G045
SLS
CSITU Fails Due to 
Inadequate Design 
Analysis, Reqts 
defintion, Ops 
P rocedures
G013
ESI 4959
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Re-Contact with the 
Vehicle
G003
ESI 5008
ESI-018 Improper ICPS Fwd Umbilical Sep
(Broken out of following charts)
8 ESI causes noted on tree (tan-shaded events).  
However, there are actually 5 unique causes on this tree.
It also shares 3 causes with previous tree.
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Tree Example #3
39
Next page
Inadequate Analysis, Definition, & Ops:
To be discussed as special topic.
Umbilical recontact:  inadequate 
retraction, capture
Release signal; Early, late, or 
no signal sent to umbilical.
(ES I-018) Improper 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Separation
ESI-018
Premature Separation 
of the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G001
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
S tructural Failure
G004
Excessive Loading
G012
Improper Fluid 
Characteristics
G016
ESI 4985
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G018
ESI 095
GSDO  Design   
A ll owable  Loads 
Exceeded
G019
GSDO
SLS Design 
  A ll owable Loads 
Exceeded
G020
SLS
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G021
GSDO 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G022
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G014
GSDO 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G015
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P remature Release
G006
Premature release 
signal sent to LRS
G007
ESI 5000
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G061
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G062
SLS
Failure to P roperly 
Separate the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G002
Late, Incorrect or No 
  ICP S  Fwd Um bi lical 
Release
G025
Late, Incorrect or No 
 Primary Release 
Mechanism
G029
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G033
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G064
GSDO
Primary mechanism is 
release cmd sent to 
LRS for Umbilical 
P late P in Retract
G067
ESI 5000
Late, Incorrect or No 
Secondary Release 
Mechanism
G063
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G065
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G066
GSDO
Secondary mechanism 
is  activation of 
GSDO winch/wire rope
G068
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P late Hangup/ 
Mechanical Binding
G045
SLS
CSITU Fails Due to 
Inadequate Design 
Analysis, Reqts 
defintion, Ops 
P rocedures
G013
ESI 4959
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Re-Contact with the 
Vehicle
G003
ESI 5008
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  Tree Example #3
40
Improper Umbilical Config:  Improper 
build-up or installation of interface 
hardware.
Improper Fluid Characteristics:  
Excessive Pressure, ice build-up
Release signal; Early signal 
sent to umbilical.
(ES I-018) Improper 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Separation
ESI-018
Premature Separation 
of the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G001
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
S tructural Failure
G004
Excessive Loading
G012
Improper Fluid 
Characteristics
G016
ESI 4985
Excessive Vehicle 
Excursion
G018
ESI 095
GSDO  Design   
A ll owable  Loads 
Exceeded
G019
GSDO
SLS Design 
  A ll owable Loads 
Exceeded
G020
SLS
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G021
GSDO 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G022
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G014
GSDO 
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G015
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P remature Release
G006
Premature release 
signal sent to LRS
G007
ESI 5000
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Improper 
Configuration 
(Assembly/Buildup)
G005
ESI 5032
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G061
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/Component 
Failure
G062
SLS
Failure to P roperly 
Separate the ICPS Fwd 
Umbilical
G002
Late, Incorrect or No 
  ICP S  Fwd Um bi lical 
Release
G025
Late, Incorrect or No 
 Primary Release 
Mechanism
G029
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G033
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G064
GSDO
Primary mechanism is 
release cmd sent to 
LRS for Umbilical 
P late P in Retract
G067
ESI 5000
Late, Incorrect or No 
Secondary Release 
Mechanism
G063
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G065
SLS
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
System/ Component  Fai
lure
G066
GSDO
Secondary mechanism 
is  activation of 
GSDO winch/wire rope
G068
GSDO
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
P late Hangup/ 
Mechanical Binding
G045
SLS
CSITU Fails Due to 
Inadequate Design 
Analysis, Reqts 
defintion, Ops 
P rocedures
G013
ESI 4959
ICPS Fwd Umbilical 
Re-Contact with the 
Vehicle
G003
ESI 5008
 
ESI-OWNED CAUSES
Top-Level View of IHA
41
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
• The ESI IHA currently contains 190 ESI-owned causes.
• Number fluctuates due to:
• New Cause Trees being developed
• Combining of like causes where possible
• Deletion of causes due to non-applicability, non-credibility, transfer to program-only
• Many causes share much in common with other similar causes in the 
general hazard scenario and mitigation approach.  
• IHAWG categorizes each hazard cause to facilitate review and commonality 
of approach.
• Aids in cause scoping and table-top reviews where IHAWG can review similar 
causes one or two sessions.
• 20+ cause categories are used as shown on following chart.
42
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Cause Categories Used by IHAWG
43
Cause 
Category
Description
Number of 
Causes
Analysis Inadequate analysis, design, or ops 50
Recontact Recontact during lift-off, sep, or jettison 19
Fluid Char
Improper fluid characteristics across interface 
(temp, pressure, flow, etc.)
17
Config Improper build-up/config of interface 16
Cryo Load Over-/under-press, geysering, over-/under-load 15
EMI Improperly characterized or controlled EMI 9
Arcing Arcing within T-0 electrical connection 8
Comm Loss of or improper communication 8
Channelization Improper signal path between elements 7
Data Char Improper/corrupted data signal across interface 7
Flam Flammable environment 5
Structural Structural failure 5
Abort Inadvertent abort 5
Ops Ops outside certified limits 4
IOP Excessive ignition over-pressure or acoustics 3
DOLILU Improper or corrupted DOLILU 2
FTS Inadvertent FTS or FTS failure when needed 2
Recovery Unable to recover crew 2
Traj Trajectory anomalies 2
Excursion Excessive excursion of flight or ground elements 1
Materials Material incompatibility 1
Power Improper power between programs 1
Release Sig Early, late, or no release signal to T-0’s 1
Total 190
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
44
Example of Typical Cause Sheet
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
45
Example of Typical Cause Sheet
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
46
Example of Typical Cause Sheet
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
47
Example of Typical Cause Sheet
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Causes
48
Example of Typical Cause Sheet
 
Slices of the IHA
49
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CAUSE SPECIAL TOPICS – ANALYSIS 
CAUSES
Slices of the IHA
50
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Analysis Causes
• IHAWG applied Shuttle IHA experience gained during Columbia return to flight 
regarding integrated design analyses.
• Primary objectives for developing these causes:
• Determine if integrated (cross-program) analysis is needed to characterize a potential hazard, 
validate the effectiveness of controls, or identify controls.  Assure such an analysis exists, is in-
work, or planned.
• Identify the actual analyses needed along with supporting models.
• Capture the controls & verifications needed to provide confidence in the results of the analyses.
• Management/Engineering processes that govern development, maintenance, approval of 
analyses/models and results.
• Plans for validation of results – testing, peer review, etc.
• Identify the critical assumptions and inputs, including those from other programs.  
• Identify the key design requirements resulting from analyses and assure requirements are 
implemented appropriately in IRDs/ICDs or other cross-program specs as appropriate.
• Identify needed operational requirements or constraints needed to assure system is operated 
within design limits derived from key analytical inputs or assumptions.
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Analysis Causes (continued)
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Analysis
Key Assumptions
Key Inputs
Critical Models
Results
Design Docs Ops Req’mnts
Accounted For
Approved &
Controlled & Validated
Included
Accounted For
Key Parameters
Performed & 
Documented
Accounted For
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Analysis Causes
• Implementation was difficult.
• Completely different than a system HA
• What value does this add?
• What needs to be captured?
• What analyses does this apply to?
• IHAWG developed guidelines for analysis-related causes for use by Cause Teams
• Cause Scoping:
• Identify System/Critical Functions
• ID potential hazards associated with loss of and performance of functions.
• ID critical attributes associated with functions:  Loads/margins; pressure/temp/flow rate; data 
transfer; tolerances; etc.
• ID any integrated analyses needed to characterize critical attributes: loads; CFD; tolerance 
stack-up; electrical; etc.
• Controls:
• Provide confidence in adequacy/accuracy of models: V&V; testing; conservatism; etc.
• ID how/where resulting design parameters are documented;
• ID any needed operational constraints required to assure system operated within limits as 
analyzed
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Analysis Causes (continued)
• Implementation was still difficult.
• Some “integrated” analyses not really cross-program.
• Some analyses delegated to lower levels.
• Identifying the real critical parameters is not straight-forward.
• Guidance doesn’t fit all situations.
• Team made very good progress, but still lots of work ahead.
• Several iterations of causes through IHAWG table-top reviews.  23 of 31 causes approved for 
release for GSDO PDR.
• Have some good examples for others in team to use.
54
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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56
Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
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62
Example of Analysis Cause Sheet
 
CAUSE SPECIAL TOPICS – DEBRIS 
HAZARDS
Slices of the IHA
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
Debris Hazards
• Generally, debris impacts do not constitute integrated hazards from the strictest sense 
of the IHA definition.
• ESD Programs are not required to tolerate strikes from debris liberated by other programs.
• However, assessment of cross-program risks from debris is a highly integrated 
activity.
• Debris Transport Analysis needed to estimate likelihood of debris strikes to critical areas of 
flight and ground systems.
• Approach to debris hazards:
• Programs identify their debris sources.
• Cross-Program Debris Team (sub-team under Loads ITT) performs DTA using inputs from 
Programs.  Results (debris environment) will be documented for Program assessment.
• Programs assess potential damage from debris environment.
• Results documented in program-owned hazard reports.
• IHAWG will own cause(s) associated with integrated analysis (DTA).
• IHAWG will capture/track program-owned debris hazards as events in Cause Tree ESI-049 
(Debris Impacts that Result in Catastrophic Failure).
64
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
65
ESI-049 – Ascent and Liftoff Debris Impact that Results in Catastrophic Failure
ESI-owned DTA CauseArea where IHAWG Tracks Program 
Debris Strike Hazards
Debris Environment 
Exceeds Expected Env.
Incorrect Debris Source 
Definition
Debris Hazards
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CAUSE SPECIAL TOPICS – T-0/UMBILICAL 
CAUSES
Slices of the IHA
66
 
Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
67
NOTIONAL
Eric Bissonnette LX-S1
T-0 Interfaces (GSDO-Flight)
Courtesy of GSDO
• 2 cause trees developed for each T-0 interface:
• Malfunction of interface up to separation
• Improper separation
• Premature separation
• Failure to properly separate 
• Recontact with flight vehicle
Malfunction Up To Sep Improper Sep
Improper Signal 
Characteristics
Improper Signal Path
Improper Fluid Characteristics
Inadequate Analysis, Design Def, or Operational Procedures
Improper Configuration
Arcing and Ignition Sources
Recontact
Early/Late/No Release Signal (1 cause record for all T-0 I/Fs)
177.4’
212.2’
322.4’
0.0’
Ø
27.
6’
iCPSU
(2 Plates)
ML Deck
LAS ECS 
TSMs are both on 
South side of ML
Swing Arm
CSITU
(Core Stage 
Avionics and 
GH2 Vent)
Swing Arm
OSMU 1
(ECS, Avionics)
Tilt Up
Pull Off
T-0 
Vehicle 
Stabilizer
Drop Down
TSM 1
Tilt Up
TSM 2
Tilt Up
ASEU/ASPU 1
Rise Off
ASEU/ASPU 2
Rise Off
CSFSU
Swing Arm
Causes
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Top-Level View of the ESI IHA:  IHA Cause Categories
• There are 66 IHA Causes related to T-0 Interfaces (Umbilicals and Vehicle 
Stabilization System)
• 35% of all Causes (190)
• 44% of Causes applicable to GSDO PDR (149)
• Cause categorization helped promote commonality and consistency in these 
causes.
• Special TIMs were convened to address certain T-0 related Cause 
categories.
68
 
DISCUSSION OF HIGH-RISK CAUSES
Slices of the IHA
69
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Slices of the IHA:  High-Risk Causes
• Per ESD S&MA Plan, any hazards with 3x5 LxS or higher are elevated to ESD (ECB) 
for final acceptance.  This would occur later in the life cycle once hazards are finalized 
(prior to FRR or equivalent).
• At each major program and integrated milestone, the SSAR will contain a brief 
discussion of each hazard cause that meet the elevation criteria.
• Discussion is for visibility.  Idea is to provide risk acceptor with current risk picture 
before affordable options for mitigation are lost.
• SSAR for any given Program milestone will only include high-risk causes 
applicable to that Program.
• Likelihoods will fluctuate over time with changes in uncertainty, design and design 
definition, operational definition, etc.  
• Initial likelihoods of IHA causes reflect best understanding of identified controls 
informed by experience.  
• With exception of single watch item associated with one of these causes that was 
elevated to CPIT, IHAWG does believe any additional management attention is 
required at this time.
70
 
Slices of the IHA:  High-Risk Causes
• Following charts summarize High-Risk Causes that are depicted in the GSDO PDR 
version of the SSAR.  
• All high-risk causes will be included in the SSAR at ESD Design Sync
71
Record Title LxS
4302 Bird Strikes During Ascent  (to be discussed as Watch Item) 5x5
4424 External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lag RS-25 H2 3x5
4426 H2 external to the vehicle due to unburned H2 from core stage APU exhaust
3x5
4428 External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lead RS-25 H2 3x5
4610 Loss of SLS to GSDO hardline communication due to improper system characteristics
3x5
4983 Improper load of the ICPS LO2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill
3x5
4981 Improper load of the ICPS LH2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill
3x5
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Record Title LxS
4302 Bird Strikes During Ascent  (to be discussed as Watch tem) 5x5
4424 External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lag RS-25 H2 3x5
• Fuel-rich mixture during on-pad shutdown.  Potential for hazard environment external 
to vehicle if H2 not burned off or diluted.
• Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) placement and analysis in-work so 
effectiveness is uncertain.
• Preliminary Rain Bird flow rates and timing for acoustics potentially negate HBOI 
effectiveness.
• FireEx activation also affects HBOI operation.
• Cause Likelihood is Moderate:  “May occur.  Controls exist with some uncertainty.
• SLS PDR RID SLSP-0059:
• HBOI output will be modeled and HBOIs will be aligned to provide max coverage.
• Diverter plate on ML to protect HBOIs being modeled.
• FireEx analysis in work.
• Risk will be reassessed as part of RID closure.
• Cause record likelihood is expected to be categorized as low upon completion of the 
analysis.
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Record Title LxS
4426 H2 external to the vehicle due to unburned H2 from core stage APU exhaust
3x5
• Core Stage CAPU vents GH2 below the Engine Section.  Failure to burn-off the 
CAPU GH2 as it emerges from the Core Stage exhaust vents could result in 
hazardous concentrations of hydrogen external to the vehicle.  
• Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) placement and analysis in-work so effectiveness 
is uncertain.
• Cause Likelihood is Moderate:  “May occur.  Controls exist with some uncertainty.
• SLS PDR RID SLSP-0059, HBOI Effectiveness:
• HBOI output will be modeled and HBOIs will be aligned to provide max coverage 
for CAPU H2.
• Risk will be reassessed as part of RID closure.
• Cause record likelihood is expected to be categorized as low upon completion of the 
analysis.
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Record Title LxS
4428 External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lead RS-25 H2 3x5
• Fuel-rich mixture during RS-25 start.  Potential for hazard environment external to 
vehicle if H2 not burned off or diluted.
• Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) placement and analysis in-work so 
effectiveness is uncertain.
• Cause Likelihood is Moderate:  “May occur.  Controls exist with some uncertainty.
• SLS PDR RID SLSP-0059:
• HBOI output will be modeled and HBOIs will be aligned to provide max coverage.
• Risk will be reassessed as part of RID closure.
• Cause record likelihood is expected to be categorized as low upon completion of the 
analysis.
 
75
Record Title LxS
4610 Loss of SLS to GSDO hardline communication due to improper system characteristics
3x5
• Loss of hardline communication could occur if the redundant Ethernet cables, 
which run in close proximity to each other, were compromised/destroyed, possibly 
due to a common cause issue. 
• Loss of hardline communication could result in:
• Inability to execute critical functions/commands.
• Inability to monitor the state of a system, for example the pressure and 
temperature of a tank or the voltage of a battery. 
• Loss could result in catastrophic events such as over stressing structures (over 
filling, wrong sequence, etc.) 
• IHAWG will work with cross-program safing team to capture operational responses 
to loss of comm events.
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Record Title LxS
4981 Improper load of the ICPS LH2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill 3x5
4983 Improper load of the ICPS LO2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill 3x5
• Prop under fill of propellants leads to premature engine shutdown/abort. 
• Overfill could cause:
• Wetting of pressurization diffuser to with potential pressurization control issues. 
• Propellant mass exceeds the mission needs (loss of payload delivery performance). 
• Prop flowing through vent/relief valve possibly causing a fire/explosion. 
• Icing and blockage at the vent relief valve, possibly resulting in an over pressurization and 
structural failure of the tank. 
• Currently many unknowns, TBDs, and TBRs. 
• The number and extent of what analyses to be done. 
• Wet dress rehearsal is the only procedural testing that will be done for verifying the 
loading requirements of the ICPS. 
• Differential pressure transducer for monitoring the propellant fill level is zero fault 
tolerant. (SPIO reports that the pressure transducer is only critical during loading, 
and could be replaced on the pad assuming adequate access . There is currently a 
trade study underway in regards to the removal of the ICPS access arm.)
• Engineering working the TBD/TBRs and should be matured in the coming months. 
• Once analyses completed and relevant documents are released, the risk should be lowered.
 
ELEVATED IHAWG WATCH ITEMS
Slices of The IHA
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Slices of the IHA:  Elevated Watch Items
• IHA Cause Record #4302, “Bird strikes during ascent”
• LxS:  5x5
• Lead Program:  GSDO
• Summary:
• No controls for catastrophic hazard resulting from a bird strike have been identified.
• Likelihood based on lack of controls and Shuttle experience of 1 strike in
• Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) defines bird 
environment (2.2 kg commonly found up to an altitude of 0.5 km above MLP).
• SLS Program Vehicle Design Environments does not allocate launch/ascent flora/fauna 
environments to SLS elements as a design requirement. 
• The risk of exposure to this environment to be assessed as part of the hazard analysis
• Orion System Requirements Document requires Orion to meet its requirements during and 
after exposure to the environments defined in the Cross-Program DSNE.
• Actual design capability is uncertain but not expected to meet DSNE based on CxP
history*.
• GSDO has no requirement to provide operational controls for bird strike.
• WI elevated to CPIT on 12/9/13
• Action to IHAWG to reassess likelihood using other applicable launch history from KSC & 
CCAFS.
78
* In waning days of CxP, Program was moving away from augmenting designs to withstand bird strikes towards 
using operational controls similar to Shuttle (avian radar, bird abatement, etc.). (reference Orion Change 
Directive #CEV-00254 and CxP directive C000432)
 
DEEP DIVE WHERE DAN WANTS TO GO
Slices of the IHA
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AREAS WHERE IHA IMPACTED DESIGN
Success Stories
80
 
Success Stories:  Where IHA Impacted Design
 The development and review of the IHA adds another level of cross-
program integration:
 Cause Tree development and review
 Cause Development
 Cause Review 
 The IHA team has been identifying issues as the analysis has matured, 
then passing them on to the design teams through the engineering 
representatives who then work them as part of their design cycles.
 With this “as they pop up” approach, the team has not tried to document them 
unless they remain an issue and end up on the Watch Item List.
 The next chart contains some examples that have been recalled by members.
 IHAWG has CSI action to track instances where IHA has impacted design 
or operations.
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Success Stories:  Where IHA Impacted Design
82
IHA Process Finding Results
Identified a potential failure tolerance deficiency during 
umbilical cause tree development that needed further 
interface work between JSC and KSC.
Design issue was identified and 
solution being worked in 
engineering
Requirements for limiting vehicle charging were deemed 
insufficient for controlling static build-up.
Cross-Program E3 requirements 
were updated (MPCV 70080).
Identified integrated analyses needed to characterize 
potential hazards or hazard controls: e.g., MSA 
hazardous gas analysis; SLS/Orion separation analysis; 
combined external leakage flammability analysis; core 
stage pressurization analysis given H2 bleed for APUs.
New analyses are in work.
Identification of LVSA diaphragm as a potential for 
several hazards which may reduce its intended 
advantage
Part of trade study to 
keep/remove diaphragm.
Identified Hydraulic lock up on the engine throttle valve. Identified integrated cause that 
needs analysis to determine 
consequence before working 
failure tolerance. 
 
Success Stories:  IHA Status for GSDO PDR
• IHA Team delivered SSAR for GSDO PDR.
• 70 of 75 Cause Trees
• 139 of 149 Causes
• 10 Causes not approved for release (forward work):
• 7 Inadequate Analysis Causes on umbilicals and CAA
• 2 causes regarding inadvertent abort while on pad
• 1 Aft Skirt Purge umbilical configuration
• SSAR also includes 27 of 33 Causes updated since SLS PDR in response to pre-
declared RID:
• 6 Causes not approved for release:
• 1 on-hold pending SM/ICPS diaphragm trade study
• 3 Orion H/W jettison d/t SLS notification
• 1 RS-25/Booster plume analysis
• 1 Orion S-Band comm
• Other forward work includes updated program cause accountability matrix.
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Forward Work for IHA
84
 
Forward Work:  IHA Model Completeness & Sustainability
• As acknowledged prior to adoption of the ESI IHA methodology, the lack of a 
comprehensive model could result in gaps in the analysis.
• In addition, the current IHA model (Cause Trees) may not be easily maintainable or 
sustainable in the long run.
• The Cause Trees are not logically linked together and therefore have no easily 
recognizable relationship to each other.
• Related causes are spread across multiple trees (e.g., fire/explosion).
• Future owners and reviewers of the IHA will need specific understanding of the 
unique methodology employed in order to maintain the model.
• The IHAWG will evaluate options for evolving the current cause tree structure with the 
goal to have a comprehensive and sustainable model by the ESI Design-To Sync 
point.
• Planned completion: ESI Design Sync
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Forward Work:  Vehicle Safing in Response to Failures
• The IHA addresses conditions that may lead to realization of a critical or catastrophic 
outcome.  However, not all of these conditions are imminently critical or catastrophic 
depending on time of occurrence and/or responses to initiating conditions.
• Loss of comm and loss of power between GSDO and flight systems (as examples)  
are assessed with a catastrophic severity.  However, mitigations may be implemented 
such as safing responses (automated on flight systems) and operational work-
arounds.  
• The IHAWG is participating in the ad hoc cross-program team looking at potential 
responses to such initiating events.
• IHAWG will provide hazardous scenarios from the IHA.  
• Proposed safing operations will be assessed as part of the IHA.
• Planned completion: Orion Δ-PDR
86
 
Forward Work:  MM/OD
• MM/OD is not currently included in the IHA.
• IHAWG will assess need for inclusion of MMOD in new or existing cause 
tree(s).  
• Planned completion: Orion Δ-PDR
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Forward Work:  Road to Orion Delta-PDR and ESI Sync Point
• Beyond forward work already discussed, IHAWG at a minimum will:
• Update causes and cause trees as needed
• Improve commonality and consistency across IHA content
• Improve cohesiveness between causes and cause trees (or future 
model)
88
 
Backup 
89
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Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review for PDR
Distribution of Work Load
90
190 Causes
75 Cause Trees
 
Approach to ESI IHA:  IHA Development & Review
SSAR Delivery Over Life Cycle - DRAFT
91
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• Cause record number 4408 – Structural Failure of the MPCVP to SLSP Interface due to Improper Loads Analysis or 
Definition during Ascent up to SM Separation
• Engineering Lead: Rumaasha Maasha S&MA Lead: Cody Hawes
• Potential Consequences – Improper loads definition leads to load exceedances during ascent due to 
unknowns/uncertainties within the analysis leads to structural failure of the interface and/or vehicle. 
• Current Control Strategy – To ensure analysis has adequate margin and conservatism or low uncertainty. 
Engineering will  acquire modal data from a planned series of tests that include element static structural tests, 
element modal tests, a modal survey of the integrated vehicle in the VAB, and an instrumented roll-out. Engineering 
expects these test to provide sufficient data to confirm/validate the integrated vehicle model.
• Current Verification Strategy – Review and approval of the analysis and methodology by the Joint Loads Task 
Team (JLTT). Validation of models via the rollout and modal test. Engineering will review data from the modal survey 
and compare it to the model; any significant outliers could potentially delay the launch until the correlation between 
the model and the test is better understood.
• Likelihood Justification – The likelihood of structural failure due to an improper loads analysis/definition is currently 
ranked as moderate due to the uncertainty within the design; however, the uncertainty factors applied during the 
analysis/model and the FoS used during hardware design help mitigate the risk of loads exceeding the structural 
capability. The modal survey test should drive out potential discrepancies within the model. 
• Recommendations – Based on the better understanding of the application of uncertainty factors and FoS, 
recommend lowering likelihood to 2x5 (Low). Although it is possible to have errors within the loads definition process 
the uncertainty factors applied to the analysis and FoS applied to hardware design make the possibility of structural 
failure due to an improper loads definition low. Likelihood may be lowered more as the design matures and as the 
uncertainty within the analysis decreases.
3x5 Cause Records
92  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
3x5 Cause Records
• Cause record number 4424 - External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lag RS-25 H2
• Engineering Lead: Louise Strutzenberg S&MA Lead: Janette May
• Potential Consequences - Following an on-the-pad engine shutdown, the engine is designed to shutdown with a hydrogen lag 
which provides a fuel-rich environment to prevent LOX-rich combustion and hardware burn-through. Failure to burn-off the Lag 
GH2 as it emerges from the Core Stage Engine (CSE) nozzle could result in hazardous concentrations of hydrogen external to the 
vehicle, which could lead to a fire/explosion.
• Current Controls:
• Design:  HBOI System function for lag H2 is identified in ICD-052-01
• Design:  The HBOIs shall be configured with sufficient directional redundancy to prevent accumulation of H2 for all 
applicable environmental conditions and redundancy in the event of HBOI failure to operate. Configuration of the HBOI 
system will be documented in SLS-ICD-052-03
• Operational:  A complete ground checkout of the HBOI will be performed prior to launch.
• Placeholder Control: Firex water system may improve or worsen dilution of Lag H2 depending timing, location, etc. Will 
consider all aspects of the pad configuration including Firex timing and location in the analysis.
• Current Control Strategy – Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) or “sparklers” are used to burn-off the vented GH2 by ejecting 
hot particulates.  The HBOI system is mounted on the mobile launcher near the SLS core stage engine nozzles and is comprised 
of 6 pairs of HBOIs to provide redundant coverage for the 4 SLS CSEs and the 2 CAPU exhaust vents.
• Current Verification Strategy – TBD analysis will be performed to verify HBOIs will be adequate to ignite Lag GH2 based on 
engine-provided allowable leak rates. . Analysis will be documented in SLS-HDBK-033, SLSP Vehicle Acoustic Data Book. HBOI 
alignment will be performed to ensure adequate coverage of all four engines.
• Likelihood Justification – HBOI placement and analysis are currently in-work and therefore the effectiveness of the HBOIs are 
uncertain. Also, preliminary Rain Bird water flow rates and timing requirements for mitigating the acoustic environments hazard,
compromises, or completely removes the HBOIs to effectively mitigate unburned Lag GH2 by potentially deflecting or quenching 
the HBOI output (hot particulates).  Firex water (used to cool the surrounding surfaces to prevent re-ignition/explosion events 
during on-the-pad engine shutdown) may also worsen (or improve) HBOI effectiveness. Per SLS-RQMT-015, Moderate definition: 
May occur. Controls exist with some uncertainties.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
3x5 Cause Records
• Cause record number 4424 - External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lag RS-25 H2 (continued)
• Recommendation – The HBOI output will be modeled and then aligned to provide maximum coverage with both 
systems operating across the modeled Main Engine Nozzle exit plane. A diverter plate on the ML to cascade rain bird 
water around HBOIs is currently being modeled. Firex water analysis on Lag GH2 during pad abort is in-work. Analysis 
supports PDR RID SLSP-0059, HBOI Effectiveness.  Re-assessment of the risk level will be a part of its closure. This 
cause record is expected to be categorized as low upon completion of the analysis. 
94  
• Cause record number 4426 – H2 external to the vehicle due to unburned H2 from Core Auxiliary Power Units (CAPU) 
exhaust 
• Engineering Lead: Louise Strutzenberg S&MA Lead: Janette May
• Potential Consequences – Core Stage CAPU system has been designed to vent GH2 below the Engine Section.  
Failure to burn-off the CAPU GH2 as it emerges from the Core Stage exhaust vents at engine start could result in 
hazardous concentrations of hydrogen external to the vehicle, which could lead to a fire/explosion.
• Current Controls:
• Design:  The HBOIs shall be configured with sufficient directional redundancy to prevent accumulation of H2 for all 
applicable environmental conditions and redundancy in the event of HBOI failure to operate. Configuration of the HBOI 
system will be documented in SLS-ICD-052-03
• Operational:  A complete ground checkout of the HBOI will be performed prior to launch.
• Current Control Strategy – Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) or “sparklers” are used to burn-off the vented GH2 
by ejecting hot particulates.  The HBOI system is mounted on the mobile launcher near the SLS core stage engine 
nozzles and is comprised of 6 pairs of HBOIs to provide redundant coverage for the 4 SLS CSEs and the 2 CAPU 
exhaust vents.
• Current Verification Strategy – TBD analysis will be performed to verify HBOIs will be adequate to ignite CAPU H2 
based on Core-provided allowable leak rates. . Analysis will be documented in SLS-HDBK-033, SLSP Vehicle 
Acoustic Data Book. HBOI alignment will be performed to ensure adequate coverage of both CAPU exhaust vents.
• Likelihood Justification – HBOI placement and analysis are currently in-work and therefore the effectiveness of the 
HBOIs are uncertain. Per SLS-RQMT-015, Moderate definition: May occur. Controls exist with some uncertainties.
• Recommendations – The HBOI output will be modeled and then aligned to provide maximum coverage with both 
systems operating across the modeled CAPU exhaust vents. Analysis supports PDR RID SLSP-0059, HBOI 
Effectiveness.  Re-assessment of the risk level will be a part of its closure. This cause record is expected to be 
categorized as low upon completion of the analysis. 
3x5 Cause Records
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• Cause record number 4428 – External H2 due to failure to dilute/inert Lead RS-25 H2 
• Engineering Lead: Louise Strutzenberg S&MA Lead: Janette May
• Potential Consequences – The engine is designed to start with a hydrogen lead which provides a fuel-rich 
environment to prevent LOX-rich combustion and hardware burn-through.  Failure to burn-off the Lead GH2 as it 
emerges from the Core Stage Engine (CSE) nozzle prior to engine start could result in hazardous concentrations of 
hydrogen external to the vehicle, which could lead to a fire/explosion.
• Current Controls:
• Design:  HBOI System function for Lead H2 is identified in ICD-052-01
• Design:  The HBOIs shall be configured with sufficient directional redundancy to prevent accumulation of H2 for all 
applicable environmental conditions and redundancy in the event of HBOI failure to operate. Configuration of the HBOI 
system will be documented in SLS-ICD-052-03
• Operational: A complete ground checkout of the HBOI will be performed prior to launch.
• Current Control Strategy – Hydrogen Burn-Off Igniters (HBOIs) or “sparklers” are used to burn-off the vented GH2 
by ejecting hot particulates.  The HBOI system is mounted on the mobile launcher near the SLS core stage engine 
nozzles and is comprised of 6 pairs of HBOIs to provide redundant coverage for the 4 SLS CSEs and the 2 Core 
Auxiliary Power Units (CAPU) exhaust vents.
• Current Verification Strategy – TBD analysis will be performed to verify HBOIs will be adequate to ignite Lead H2 
based on engine-provided allowable leak rates. Analysis will be documented in SLS-HDBK-033, SLSP Vehicle 
Acoustic Data Book. HBOI alignment will be performed to ensure adequate coverage of all four engines.
• Likelihood Justification – HBOI placement and analysis are currently in-work and therefore the effectiveness of the 
HBOIs are uncertain. Per SLS-RQMT-015, Moderate definition: May occur. Controls exist with some uncertainties.
• Recommendations – The HBOI output will be modeled and then aligned to provide maximum coverage with both 
systems operating across the modeled Main Engine Nozzle exit plane. Analysis supports PDR RID SLSP-0059, HBOI 
Effectiveness.  Re-assessment of the risk level will be a part of its closure. This cause record is expected to be 
categorized as low upon completion of the analysis. 
3x5 Cause Records
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Background
3x5 Cause Records
Rain Bird
Firex
HBOI
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• Background
4.1.7 Hydrogen Burn off Igniter (CL-8000)
The purple shaded cones shown in Figures 4-52, 4-53, and 4-54 notionally depict the coverage of the Hydrogen Burn Off 
Igniters (HBOI) for the Core Stage Engines exhaust and TVC CAPU exhaust. The HBOI system will be comprised of 2 sets of 6 
each HBOIs (12 total per launch attempt) to provide redundant coverage for the 4 SLS Core Stage Engines and the 2 pairs of  
Core Auxiliary Power Unit exhaust vents. They will be directed at the SLS Core Stage Main Engines and CAPU exhaust vent 
pairs. The HBOI output is specified for a 15’ minimum throw with a 20㼻 cone pattern. The cone angle pattern will be modeled 
and then aligned to provide maximum coverage with both systems operating across the modeled Main Engine Nozzle exit 
plane. CAPU Exhaust Vent HBOIs will be directed at the each of the modeled exhaust vent locations.  HBOIs will provide a 
minimum of 22 seconds burn duration and ignited prior to Core Stage Main Engine start (~ T-10 seconds).
3x5 Cause Records
Figure 4-52. HBOI Coverage Bottom View
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• Cause record number 4582 – Ascent Trajectory Anomaly due to Unexpected Dynamic Response
• Engineering Lead: Rumaasha Maasha S&MA Lead: Cody Hawes
• Potential Consequence – Inability to correctly define or characterize the vehicle dynamic modes and responses 
causes load exceedances and leads to structural failure of the vehicle.  
• Current Control Strategy – To ensure analysis has adequate margin and conservatism or low uncertainty. 
Engineering will  acquire modal data from a planned series of tests that include element static structural tests, 
element modal tests, a modal survey of the integrated vehicle in the VAB, and an instrumented roll-out. Engineering 
expects these test to provide sufficient data to confirm/validate the integrated vehicle model. Control algorithms are 
validated through rigorous testing in multiple dynamic situations. 
• Current Verification Strategy – Review and inspection of MAVERIC and Monte Carlo models to ensure compliance 
with the model and simulation plan. Models shall also be validated via the rollout and modal test. 
• Likelihood Justification – The likelihood of structural failure due to load exceedances caused by an unexpected 
dynamic response is currently ranked as moderate due to the uncertainty within the design; however, uncertainty 
factors applied to the G&NC algorithms used in the analysis and the FoS used during hardware design help  mitigate 
the risk of loads exceeding the structural capability.  The margin/uncertainty factors used in the analysis account for 
uncertainty and errors. The modal survey test should drive out potential discrepancies within the model and it is 
very unlikely to launch without proper correlation of the model to the test.  
• Recommendations – Based on the better understanding of the application of uncertainty factors to the G&NC 
algorithms and FoS used during hardware design, recommend lowering likelihood to 2x5 (Low). Likelihood may be 
lowered more as the design matures and as the uncertainty within the analysis decreases. 
3x5 Cause Records
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• Cause Record number 4610 – Loss of SLS to GSDO hardline communication due to improper system characteristics
• Engineering Leads: Jon Patterson, John Ormsby, and Bob Trapnell S&MA Lead: Early McKnight
• Hazard Cause – Loss of command/data path communication between Ground Support Design Organization (GSDO) 
and Space Launch System (SLS) interface during critical operations in the preflight phase of launch resulting in 
inability to execute functions like opening or closing valves or switches; and inability to monitor the state of a system, 
for example temperature and pressure of a tank or voltage of a battery.
• Potential Consequences – Potential consequences include over/under filling tanks resulting in structural failure or 
inability to reach target, inability to safely remove cryogens if required, loss of vehicle power due to under 
charged/damaged batteries, and failure to process commands.  All of which potentially resulting in Loss of Mission 
(LOM), or Loss of Crew (LOC).
• Current Control Strategy – Currently, controls to ensure a viable communication path with fault tolerance are not 
ensured.  The existence of redundant paths and separation of those redundant paths has been demonstrated to 
some extent, but common cause potential still exist.
• Likelihood Justification – The likelihood applied to this cause is moderate because of the uncertainty resulting from 
immaturity of analysis
• Recommendations –
• GSDO to provide capability to detect loss of communication sufficient to prevent catastrophic failure of vehicle or GSDO
• SLS to provide capability to detect loss of communication sufficient to prevent catastrophic failure of vehicle system
• Upon detection of loss of communication, switch to backup communication 
• Upon detection of loss of Safety-critical communication link, SLS and GSDO to provide capability to safe vehicle and/or 
ground systems as expeditiously as possible in order to minimize risk to crew, vehicle and facilities
3x5 Cause Records
100  
• Cause record number 4981 – Improper load of the ICPS LH2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill
• Engineering Lead: Jay Russell S&MA Lead: Dustin Drake
• Potential Consequences – Under fill of propellants will lead to premature engine shutdown causing loss of vehicle 
thrust resulting in a mission abort. Overfill could cause the pressurization diffuser to become wetted which could 
result in potential pressurization control issues. Excessive overfill could result in LH2 flowing through vent/relief valve 
possibly causing a fire/explosion. Excessive overfill could also cause icing and blockage at the vent relief valve, 
possibly resulting in an over pressurization and structural failure of the tank. These effects or combination of effects 
may potentially result in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew. 
• Current Control Strategy – The propellant fill level sensor system in conjunction with GSDO control software will 
allow proper control of propellant flow rates to reach the nominal  propellant load per the requirements defined in the 
ICDs. Operational procedures based on heritage loading information TBD.
• Current Verification Strategy – Testing at the wet dress rehearsal to ensure operational procedures lead to a proper 
propellant fill level as well as inspection of the ICDs to ensure proper propellant requirements are documented.
• Likelihood Justification – Currently there are many TBDs and TBRs which cause uncertainties in the controls and 
overall mitigation strategy. The number and extent of what analyses are going to be done is unknown at this time. The 
wet dress rehearsal is the only procedural testing that will be done for verifying the loading requirements of the ICPS. 
The differential pressure transducer for monitoring the propellant fill level is zero fault tolerant. Failure of the 
differential pressure transducer would likely require a de-tanking and roll back to the VAB. SPIO reports claim that the 
pressure transducer is only critical during loading, and could be replaced on the pad. This assumes there will be 
adequate access to the ICPS. There is currently a trade study underway in regards to the removal of the ICPS 
access arm.
• Recommendations – Engineering is working the TBD/TBRs and should be matured in the coming months. Once 
relevant documents are baseline and the analyses are released, the risk should be lowered. Additionally, perform 
sensor and software testing to ensure that overfill can be properly detected and that the software will provide the 
correct response to the situation. Add redundancy to fill level sensor system or accept risk of a de-tanking and roll 
back assuming access to the ICPS is not available.
• Cause record number 4983 – Improper load of the ICPS LO2 tank due to Propellant Under fill / Overfill
• 4983 is identical to 4981
3x5 Cause Records
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Plan (ESD 10010) 
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